Comparing point estimates to consensus summaries are a representative sample from a population of possible characters evolving under the same 52 process, and thus can be resampled to assess confidence in parameters (Felsenstein, 1985) . While 53 morphological matrices typically include only variable characters (i.e., an ascertainment bias), 54 this is an informative subset of the possible characters, and should not be thought of as misleading 55 calculations. Were this otherwise, the original sample would be likewise suspect, as the use of 56 model-based phylogenetic inference (such as Mk) explicitly assumes characters evolve according 57 to the same process. Concerns about the interpretation and use of the bootstrap exist (Sanderson, 58 1995) , the primary of which involves the assumption that individual characters are statistically 59 independent. However, it is reasonable to assume that individual sites in a morphological matrix 60 would be more independent than adjacent sites from the same gene, and genetic datasets are 61 routinely bootstrapped. We therefore disagree with the claims of Puttick et al. Depending on the level of uncertainty involved, an optimal point estimate from a distribution 101 (e.g., MLE or MAP) may be arbitrarily distant from a summary of the same distribution. And so, 102 the differences in MLE vs. BMR are not expected to be consistent. 103
The expected concordance of Bayesian and ML results
104
Our results reveal much greater congruence between Bayesian and ML estimates than suggested 105
by Puttick et al. (2017) . This is to be expected. ML and Bayesian tree construction methods 106 should yield similar results under the conditions in which they are often employed. While 107
Bayesian tree reconstruction differs from ML by incorporating prior distributions, the methods 108 share likelihood functions. In phylogenetics, researchers typically adopt non-informative priors, 109 with a few exceptions (e.g., priors on divergence time parameters). Arguments can be made for 110 pseudo-Bayesian approaches when care is taken to ensure that priors used are truly uninformative, 111 which result in posterior probabilities that mirror the likelihood and are therefore congruent with 112 ML ( Alternatively, inappropriate priors can positively mislead (Gelman et al., 2014 
